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This article has two complementary goals. First, it offers a political 
economy analysis of the achievements, limitations and alternatives to 
conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs). Second, it contributes to the 
evolving dialogue between heterodox economists and scholars working 
on and around social policy, in order to support the development of 
analytical as well as practical alternatives to neoliberalism.
CCTs are among the most significant innovations in social policy in 
the last two decades, especially in developing countries. These programs 
currently reach tens of millions of families in several continents. In what 
follows, the origins, conceptual foundations, key features, impact and 
limitations of CCTs are examined. The article recognizes the contribution 
of CCTs to the amelioration of poverty and the reduction of extreme 
inequality. However, these achievements are limited by the neoliberal 
context in which CCTs have emerged and must operate. Several of these 
limitations can be addressed through the implementation of pro-poor 
universal social policies as key component parts of a broader pro-poor 
development strategy. The combination of pro-poor macroeconomic 
policies and universal and strongly distributional social policies can 
deliver faster and more significant gains against poverty and inequality 
than neoliberal policies in general, or CCTs specifically.
The article includes this introduction and five substantive sections. 
The first departs from a critical review of the dominant mainstream 
(neoclassical or neoliberal) approach, which presumes that poverty is 
caused by exclusion from labor or commodity markets, and that market- 
led growth spontaneously tends to eliminate poverty; distributional 
outcomes are merely incidental. In contrast, political economy analyses 
of poverty and distribution suggest that capital accumulation simul-
taneously creates and eliminates poverty, and it generates as well as 
reduces inequality. The overall impact of growth on poverty and inequality 
depends on the structure of the growth process and the mediations of 
social policy. 
The second section reviews the principles underpinning CCTs and 
their rise to global prominence since the mid-1990s. Examination of 
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CCTs suggests that they are the typical social policy for neoliberalism, 
since the provision of public goods and services tends to become 
individualized and take place either through private markets (education, 
transport) or private insurance (health), supported, if necessary, by 
private loans and capital markets. The state steps in—typically through 
CCTs—only in the last instance, to support the destitute.
The third outlines the limitations of CCTs. These programs bring 
the very poor into the market as residual buyers of commodities and as 
borrowers. However, CCTs are limited for cost, efficiency and equity 
reasons. Even though they can assist the target groups at the margin, they 
are, by design, insufficient to transform the economic, social and 
political structures perpetuating poverty. CCTs also introduce commercial 
mediations and arbitrary limitations to the rights of citizens, manage 
poverty only within narrow limits, and provide subsidies to capital that, 
ultimately, reproduce poverty rather than supporting its elimination.
The fourth outlines a pro-poor policy alternative. This approach 
draws upon heterodox economics traditions in order to offer a compelling 
case for economic policies focusing on the basic needs of the poor and 
the improvement of the distribution of income, wealth and power. These 
policies and their outcomes can contribute to the achievement of demo-
cratic and distributive economic outcomes in many countries. This can 
be done optimally through the combination of rapid, sustainable and 
employment-intensive growth with the distribution of income and assets. 
The concluding section summarizes the main findings and their 
implications.
Poverty and Distribution under Neoliberalism
In the mainstream (orthodox, neoclassical or neoliberal) economics 
tradition, market integration is the driving force of economic growth, for 
example, through entrepreneurship, employment or consumption, 
funded by profits, wages, (micro-)credit or transfers. Conversely, poverty 
derives from exclusion from labor, commodity or financial markets 
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because of (generally arbitrary) limitations to voluntary exchange.1 In 
this literature, poverty is both defined and measured by the inability to 
reach arbitrary income or expenditure lines, for example, the World 
Bank’s US$1.90 per day. Distribution is incidental, since it presumably 
reflects each agent’s contribution to social wealth; consequently, deterio-
rations in the distribution of income or wealth are either self-correcting 
or market responses to productivity or other structural economic shifts. 
In either case, policies aiming to reduce inequality would likely be futile 
and might create inefficiency-generating distortions.2 It follows that the 
“trickle down” effect of growth can eliminate poverty in the long term; in 
the short term, targeted social programs can supplement incomes, create 
the “correct” incentives, and support the reduction of poverty at low cost. 
Social protection, then, is either a temporary safety net to assist the poor 
while they seek permanent insertion into the market, or a response to 
random shocks creating temporary vulnerabilities to some households.
Political economy traditions, including the Marxist, Kaleckian, 
Post-Keynesian, evolutionary and other schools of thought, argue that 
the mainstream approach is misleading because it decontextualizes 
poverty, vulnerability and inequality, and obscures their sources and 
structures of reproduction. Recognition of these limitations can help to 
explain the tendency of mainstream economics to have over-optimistic 
expectations about the impact of growth on poverty.
Radical political economy approaches, centered around Marxist 
political economy, claim that capital accumulation and economic growth 
1 See Voitchovsky (2009) for a detailed review of the mainstream literature 
on poverty and inequality. The relationship between inequality and growth 
is examined by Dollar, Kleineberg and Kraay (2013); for a critical review, 
see Therborn (2013).
2 For a mainstream analysis of the relationship between growth, poverty and 
political settlements, see the POUM (prospect of upward mobility) hypothesis 
presented by Bénabou and Ok (2001). For a detailed examination, including 
empirical estimates, see Checchi and Filippin (2004) and Graham and 
Pettinato (2000).
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both create and eliminate poverty, and they drive processes that can 
reduce as well as generate inequality. This richer understanding of 
poverty and inequality departs from the recognition that the patterns of 
growth, the dynamics of poverty and the forms of reproduction of 
inequality are determined by key social, political and economic relation-
ships. They include the ownership of land, capital and financial assets, 
the composition of output and employment, the social and institutional 
framework, the structures of competition and the labor markets, the 
modalities of international integration and access to basic goods (e.g., 
education, food, health, housing and transport), and how the social 
impact of growth is mediated by social policy. In order to capture these 
complex determinants, their interactions and the ensuing outcomes, it is 
useful to distinguish between absolute poverty and market-generated 
poverty (Dagdeviren et al. 2002).
Absolute poverty is due to a country’s low levels of income and 
productivity, and it tends to decline as the economy grows (“a rising tide 
lifts all boats”). Growth creates new jobs and income generating opport-
unities, and it produces scarcities that lift wages and other forms of 
income. Growth also expands markets, sales revenue and consumption 
possibilities, offers incentives to improvements in productivity and skills, 
and boosts the demand for foodstuffs and raw materials produced by the 
poor. Growth can also support poverty reduction indirectly by generating 
savings that can support further investment, and creating resources that 
can finance public goods and welfare programs.
Market-generated poverty can derive from the loss of access to 
productive assets by the poor as the economy develops, or from the form 
of integration of poor households into capitalist markets. The former can 
include eviction from the land because of changes in property or user 
rights; changes in technologies or in the composition of output; environ-
mental shifts undermining livelihoods and productive capabilities; labor 
market or demand shifts destroying jobs, devaluing skills, reducing the 
scope for informal occupations or curtailing access to credit or markets, 
and so on. The latter can include precarious modalities of commodity 
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production or (self-)employment and degrading forms of labor, such as 
child labor or indentured labor, that are normally associated with low 
productivity, low incomes and precarious living standards. In sum, the 
spread of market relations can drive wealth creation, poverty and social 
exclusion simultaneously.
If poverty is due both to insufficient development and to the 
structural inequalities constituting the economic system, it may not be 
eliminated by economic growth. For example, rapid growth in Brazil and 
Mexico between the 1950s and the 1970s, in the Gulf economies 
between the early-1970s and the mid-1980s, and in China since the 
1980s, has been associated with rising inequality and, not entirely 
unrelated, the persistence of absolute poverty. In contrast, even lower 
growth rates, if appropriately targeted, can reduce poverty and inequality 
significantly, as in Western Europe during the postwar “golden age” or in 
most Latin American countries in the 2000s. However, low and erratic 
economic growth generally fosters the stagnation or deterioration of 
welfare standards, as in most Middle Eastern, African and Latin 
American countries in the 1980s and in the former Soviet countries in the 
1990s.
The political economy approach also suggests that market-based 
growth strategies tend to intensify the asymmetries that create poverty 
and inequality even as the economy expands. Since market relations and 
growth can create poverty as well as wealth, they must be nurtured as 
well as directed. The elimination of poverty can also be supported by 
reforms addressing structural inequalities of access to, and control over, 
labor, economic assets and political power. In other words, improve-
ments in poverty and inequality are closely inter-related, and they require 
specific policies rather than “growth” in general, or social policy 
interventions merely at the margin.
Finally, since poverty is more complex than the inability to reach an 
arbitrary level of income, it follows that monetary measures of poverty 
are deficient. They can distort the perception of poverty especially at the 
borders of commercial society and in the poorest countries, where the 
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degree of commodification of social provision tends to be lower than in 
the advanced capitalist economies. Political economy approaches also 
suggest that the poverty-alleviating impact of “trickle down” can be 
small, and that the adverse distributional and employment implications 
of mainstream development strategies can overwhelm marginal compen-
satory programs. In this case, social policy can become merely a tool of 
poverty management, instead of supporting the elimination of poverty 
and promoting the distribution of the gains from growth. For example, 
Heintz and Razavi (2013:1-3) rightly argue that:
under neoliberalism, macroeconomic policies are detached 
from their social moorings...such as protecting people’s 
incomes, creating sufficient employment, or eradicating 
poverty...[focusing instead] on containing public debt and 
inflation. Social policies remain a palliative afterthought to 
address the worst social fallouts of economic policies. 
Employment and social policies...must be reconnected in 
policy design in order to frame solutions to the crisis grounded 
in long-term, sustainable, employment-centered growth.
Deeply ingrained structures of reproduction of poverty can best be 
addressed through the combination of faster growth and policies securing 
disproportionate gains to the worse-off (that is, pro-poor growth), 
wide-ranging social and economic reforms, and universal social policies 
(see section “Pro-Poor Alternatives”). In contrast, under neoliberalism 
poverty alleviation has focused on extreme forms of (absolute) poverty, 
to be addressed through (conditional) cash transfers.
CCTs and Social Policy under Neoliberalism
Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are the most significant innova-
tion in social policy in the last two decades, especially in developing 
countries. This section examines their main features, and highlights the 
close relationship between the hegemony of neoliberal economic policies 
and the emergence and diffusion of CCTs.3
74 Journal of Poverty Alleviation and International Development
CCTs are conditional safety nets comprising small non-contributory 
transfers to households that are either extremely poor or highly 
vulnerable to deprivation, especially those with children. Benefits are 
almost invariably paid to the mothers, both to empower women and 
because it is assumed that their behaviors are better aligned with the 
intended use of the funds. Essentially, CCTs aim to interrupt the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty by, simultaneously, supporting 
families and nudging parents to make better choices, especially higher 
investment in their children’s human capital. The conditionalities may 
include school attendance, preventative health care, and community 
work, typically cleaning or rubbish clearance. Lack of compliance with 
these conditionalities could lead to the suspension of benefits, fines and, 
eventually, exclusion from the CCT (Barrientos 2007: 67; Hall 2008; 
Molyneux 2007).
These basic principles encompass potentially very different 
programs across goals and conditionalities that, in turn, may be imple-
mented more or less harshly. For example, the Mexican Oportunidades 
program is notoriously coercive, while the Argentine Asignación 
Universal por Hijo (AUH), the Brazilian Programa Bolsa Família and 
the Ecuadorian Bono de Desarrollo Humano are comparatively lenient in 
case of violation of the conditionalities (Cecchini & Madariaga 2011: 
89-92).
The notion of conditionalities for households mirrors the macro-
economic conditionalities traditionally imposed by IMF- and World 
Bank-led adjustment programs. Just as the latter are meant to push 
countries to implement “correct” (neoliberal) economic policies, the 
conditionalities in CCTs are meant to support the reproduction of 
neoliberalism by inducing individuals to internalize neoliberal norms of 
behavior that, presumably, can help to reduce poverty and promote 
long-term economic growth. These include “good” behaviors, such as 
3 For a detailed empirical analysis of CCTs, focusing on the Brazilian case, 
see Saad-Filho (2015).
Social Policy Beyond Neoliberalism 75
stable wage employment or micro-entrepreneurship, and higher invest-
ment in human capital, including education, health and avoidance of 
child labor, while penalizing “bad” behaviors like leisure, begging, 
drinking or prostitution. In turn, the conditionalities should help to secure 
broad political support to the transfer programs through the reassurance 
that no one is given too much money, too easily, or indefinitely. Finally, 
in contrast with an earlier generation of social policies, that were often 
perceived to be imposed by foreign institutions, CCTs have allegedly 
emerged in the Global South in response to these countries’ own needs 
and financial and administrative limitations that, ultimately, would pre-
vent the implementation of universal policies.
CCTs have spread rapidly especially in Latin America, with 19 out 
of 23 countries implementing such programs in 2013; they have also 
been deployed in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Kenya, Pakistan, South Africa 
and many other countries.4 Around the world, at least 45 countries 
implemented CCTs in 2010, reaching 110 million families, with numbers 
continuing to grow.5
CCTs were generally introduced gradually, often starting as limited 
programs addressing specific needs or gaps in provision. They sub-
sequently expanded and became alternatives to existing (presumably 
flawed or insufficient) universal programs and, eventually, CCTs either 
became or were presented as the most important social policy in several 
countries (Fagnani 2005: 537). Their expansion was strongly encouraged 
4 CCTs are reviewed by Ballard (2012), Barrientos (2007; 2013), de Janvry 
and Sadoulet (2004), Fine (2012), Garcia and Moore (2012), Heintz and 
Lund (2012) and IDEAs (2011). Their economic impact is examined by 
Kabeer, Piza and Taylor (2012). 
5 Ballard (2012: 564). The Latin American experience with CCTs is 
reviewed by Bertranou and Maurizio (2012), Campello and Neri (2013), 
Castro and Modesto (2010), Cecchini and Madariaga (2011), ECLAC-ILO 
(2014), Galiani and McEwan (2013), Gasparini, Cicowiez and Sosa Escudero 
(2012), Oosterbeek, Ponce and Schady (2008), Pena (2014), and Stampini 
and Tornarolli (2012).
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by the international financial institutions and many organizations in the 
aid industry, including those that had supported earlier poverty- 
alleviating fads, for example the privatization of pensions in the 1980s, 
microfinance in the 1990s and, more recently, “security” (Ghosh 2011: 
850-851; Seekings 2012: 14). 
Those initiatives were invariably justified by resource limitations 
and the need to improve the market environment, optimize resource 
allocation, align incentives with the requirements of “economic effi-
ciency” (i.e., neoliberalism), and compensate the poor for the asym-
metric impact of the neoliberal reforms, particularly unemployment and 
loss of property, income, marketable skills and access to public services 
(see first section). The close relationship between the spread of CCTs and 
the diffusion of neoliberalism has been noted in the literature. For 
example:
[N]eoliberalism has created its own social policies: they are 
essentially the outcome of the displacement of the matrix of 
universal social rights towards welfarist policies...targeting 
[only] extreme poverty.... [These policies provide] very 
limited and inconsistent compensation for inequality, and fail 
to...change the structural [features of] social injustice. 
(Coraggio 2007)
The close fit between neoliberalism and CCTs can be attributed to the 
(typically neoliberal) conflation between social welfare and self- 
improvement, leading to the transfer of responsibility for welfare from 
the state to the individual: “Cash transfers have...been enfolded within 
mainstream development approaches which locate responsibility for 
transcending poverty upon the poor themselves and use grants to alter the 
behaviour of the poor.”6 
The diffusion of CCTs has also responded to the perceived failure 
of previous social policy initiatives to achieve their stated objectives, 
6 Ballard (2012: 570). See also ECLAC-ILO (2014: 14), Sepúlveda Carmona 
(2009: 6, 15), Stampini and Tornarolli (2012: 2), and UNRISD (2010: 3).
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including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and its inter-
mediate targets. CCTs can also be related to the expansion of citizens’ 
rights in the wake of the democratization of several developing countries 
since the late-1970s. While democracy expanded economic and social 
entitlements and the duties of the state, the almost simultaneous spread of 
neoliberalism drastically reduced the means available to the state to 
satisfy those rights in many countries. The rollout of tiny grants to the 
desperately needy seemed to square this circle whilst, simultaneously, 
leaving untouched the causes of deprivation and inequality.
Evaluations of the impact of CCTs have led to conflicting results. 
Advocates claim that CCTs alleviate destitution in the short-run; in the 
longer-term, they strengthen the recipients’ position in the labor market 
which, eventually, should obviate the need for transfers (Seekings 2012; 
see also World Bank 2009: 8-11). In the meantime, CCTs are cheap to run 
and easy to manage, as payments are low and targeting is based on 
centralized data systems allowing the accurate identification of bene-
ficiaries, preventing multiple claims and limiting corruption (Molyneux 
2007: 69; Seekings 2012; World Bank 2009: 8-11). Supporters of CCTs 
also claim that the conditionalities are correlated with significant 
improvements in the target variables (school attendance, vaccinations, 
pre-natal care, and so on),7 especially in the poorest areas. However, it is 
also clear that unconditional programs are as effective as CCTs, and that 
economic growth, job creation and rising minimum wages have a much 
greater impact than CCTs on the welfare of the poor (see below). 
Limitations of CCTs
The optimistic assessments of the impact of CCTs (outlined above) 
should be tempered by the recognition of seven systemic limitations of 
these programs. First, the rise of CCTs is symptomatic of the contradi-
7 See Grosh (2011), World Bank (2009) and the information available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialprotectionlabor
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ction between the expansion of citizen’s rights in a democracy, including 
the right to a minimum standard of living, and the transformation of 
social policies under neoliberalism (see above). CCTs accommodate 
these conflicting imperatives through the provision of limited assistance 
to narrowly targeted groups: for those with very little, anything extra—
regardless of conditionalities—can help. In exchange, the beneficiaries 
must fulfill obligations springing from a combination of common sense, 
expert opinion, ideology and political expediency, which are presumably 
imposed “for their own good.” 
Second, CCTs are designed to be unobjectionably cheap, generally 
costing less than 0.5 per cent of GDP.8 They are too small to support 
growth and macroeconomic stability, challenge the reproduction of 
poverty or transform the life chances of the poor by boosting their assets 
or improving their income-generating capacity—except in the long run, 
when the wage implications of marginally better schooling supposedly 
kick in (if a compatible job can be found). In other words, neoliberal 
states manage deprivation through the conditional apportionment of 
tax-funded transfers to the “deserving destitute.” In doing this, the state 
assists the wretched while it subsidizes the worst modalities of employ-
ment by “conditionally” supplementing the lowest incomes. However, if 
mass poverty is due to the lack of jobs, precarious livelihoods and 
adverse modalities of economic integration (see the first section), it can 
be soothed but not resolved by such benefactions. Experience shows that 
exiguous safety nets and targeted interventions are generally unable to 
compensate the poverty-generating impact of neoliberal macroeconomic 
strategies.
Third, targeting undermines social cohesion, validates politically- 
driven limits on public provision and compels the poor to manage their 
own dispossession, while simultaneously threatening to deprive them of 
8 The only exception is Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano, which reaches 
1.2 per cent of GDP and covers 44 per cent of the population (Lavinas 
2013: 18-19).
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their citizenship rights if they fail to meet extraneous conditions.9 CCTs 
also circumvent collective action, since the transfers bypass the insti-
tutions of collective representation, and the claimants must comply 
individually instead of claiming, and demanding, as a group.10 By 
design, CCTs exclude the non-poor, which are arbitrarily defined by 
extremely low poverty lines. Inevitably, these thresholds exclude poten-
tial claimants both at the margin and inside it because of the costs and 
difficulties of program inclusion,11 and because poverty may be driven 
by the volatility as much as the low average income of the poor (see first 
section). Those thresholds can also alienate the non-poor politically. 
Their satisfaction with the good use of their taxes may be tempered by 
aggravation towards the “parasitical” destitute, regardless of the condi-
tionalities. In sum, the limited number of beneficiaries of CCTs, given 
the stringent financial limitations of these programs, the political weak-
ness of the extremely poor,12 and the hostility of the non-poor can limit 
the scope, growth and potential impact of the CCTs.13
9 Several studies suggest that poor people tend to prefer public provision of 
goods and services rather than cash transfers; in contrast, the latter tends to 
be preferred by the better-off (Ghosh 2011: 69).
10 Lavinas (2013: 40) suggests that “arguments in favour of conditionalities 
...rest not only on their supposed efficacy but also on a logic of control 
over vulnerable groups.”
11 For example, “a family in which one of the members is formally employed 
and paid a minimum wage, although its per capita income might fall below 
the poverty line, is likely to be ruled out [from the Brazilian Bolsa Família 
programme] for having some semblance of job security” (Lavinas 2013: 
29). In the case of Bolsa Família, between 800,000 and 2.2 million quali-
fying families have not joined the programme (Lavinas 2013: 28).
12 As Sen (1995: 14) rightly put it, “[t]he beneficiaries of thoroughly targeted 
poverty-alleviation programs are often quite weak politically and may lack 
the clout to sustain the programs and maintain the quality of the services 
offered. Benefits meant exclusively for the poor often end up being poor 
benefits.”
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Fourth, CCTs include the poor primarily by bringing them to goods 
markets as consumers, while the transfers to their bank accounts draw 
them into financial markets as potential borrowers, cardholders or buyers 
of insurance policies, with a regular cash flow to offer as collateral 
(Lavinas 2013: 37). In doing this, CCTs support the privatization of basic 
goods and services and the financialization of social reproduction, while 
the welfare state is reduced to a threadbare backstop available only to the 
desperate.14 
Fifth, the conditionalities in CCTs can be fulfilled only if public 
services are available, while the state becomes prosecutor, judge and jury 
of the “success” of the poor in satisfying the conditions imposed upon 
them in order to receive benefits. This program structure can obscure the 
failure of the state to provide basic services, while potentially punishing 
the poor for not accessing facilities that may be unavailable to them:
[W]ithin countries, the areas typically inhabited by the most 
vulnerable groups are often those where health and education 
services are weakest, making them wholly unsuitable to this 
kind of approach [CCTs]. Similarly, it is typically the poorest 
and most vulnerable who will find it most costly to comply 
with any conditionalities, and are therefore the most likely to 
13 “As far as basic services are concerned, narrow targeting can have huge 
hidden costs...[because] it is often difficult to identify the poor and to 
reach them because the non-poor—most of whom remain ‘near-poor’—
seldom fail to capture a large part of subsidies destined for more destitute 
people. Also, administering narrowly targeted programs is at least twice as 
costly as running untargeted ones. In addition, the poor must frequently 
document eligibility—which involves expenses such as bus fares, apart 
from the social stigma they generate...Most importantly...once the 
non-poor cease to have a stake in narrowly targeted programs, the political 
commitment to sustain their scope and quality is at risk. The voice of the 
poor alone is usually too weak to maintain strong public support” 
(Vandemoortele 2004: 12). 
14 For a contrary view, see Ferguson (2015: 138).
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be deprived of benefits if they fail to do so—not the optimal 
model for a social protection programme. (Freeland 2007: 77; 
see also Slater 2008 & UNRISD 2010: 24).
Sixth, while targeting saves money by avoiding transfers to the 
“undeserving” poor and the better-off, these exclusions inevitably create 
administrative costs. Studies indicate that the initial screening represents 
0.4%-29% of the value of CCTs, with 9% being a typical figure. In 
contrast, self-targeting programs cost around 6% to set up, and universal 
programs even less.15 Once the poor have been identified, CCT 
management costs can reach 30% of transfers, in contrast with less than 
15% for universal programs (Sepúlveda Carmona 2009: 11). For 
example, in the Mexican Progresa programme, “costs associated with 
targeting and identifying recipients as a proportion of total costs dropped 
from 61% in the year of its launch...to 3% three years later. At the same 
time, the cost of checking conditions rose from 8% to 24%” (Cecchini & 
Madariaga 2011: 120). Those costs are lower in the advanced economies, 
where state management and communications systems are already in 
place and most claimants are literate and already hold the required 
documents.
These limitations were illustrated by a World Bank study of 122 
CCTs in 48 countries, which claims that targeting transfers 25% more to 
the poor than universal programs. However, this study also shows that 
25% of targeted programs transfer fewer resources to the poor than the 
universal alternative, that the median CCT in sub-Saharan Africa 
transfers 8% less to the poor than a universal program, and that the 
efficiency of targeting is positively correlated with per capita GDP. This 
suggests that targeting may depend on institutional capacities that could 
be lacking in the poorer countries.
Seventh, CCTs may not empower women. While their partners’ 
time and income are sheltered, women are normally expected to fulfill 
15 See Cecchini and Madariaga (2011: 120-121); Dutrey (2007: 8-9); IDEAs 
(2011); Rawlings (2004: 11) and, especially, Slater (2008: 16-19).
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government-imposed conditionalities while continuing to service their 
households:
[C]ompliance with conditionalities requires women to dedi-
cate more time to filing the certificates of school attendance 
and health check-ups for their children, which can sometimes 
involve transportation expenses and long waits.... Women 
also have to spend time in other programme-related tasks (for 
example, they are required to participate in information 
sessions or training and awareness activities). (ECLAC-ILO 
2014: 18n3) 
There is no question that CCTs can alleviate critical deprivation and 
vulnerability and support the reduction of poverty and inequality. 
However, on their own, most CCTs are too small to provide more than 
minimum income security, and their initial impact is almost entirely due 
to the extremely low level of the incomes of their target group (Higgins 
2012: 104-108; Stampini & Tornarolli 2012: 11). The contribution of 
CCTs also tends to decline over time as they cover the target population 
(“saturation”), and as incomes rise through economic growth. It follows 
that CCTs are self-limiting. Even though the immediate gains of these 
programs are immensely valuable, further improvements may not be 
sustained, and will not spontaneously follow. This raises the question of 
what should either supplement or replace the CCTs in order to secure 
faster and more decisive gains against persistent poverty. 
Pro-Poor Alternatives
It would be utopian to aspire to eliminate poverty and reduce 
inequality significantly, efficiently or rapidly through social policy alone: 
the resources available for distribution are determined by macroe-
conomic outcomes, and the impact of household earned income upon 
poverty and inequality tends to dwarf the effect of transfers. Experience 
shows that transformative outcomes require macroeconomic policy 
changes and the elimination of the social and economic structures that 
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reproduce poverty over time. The most effective arrangement for 
neutralizing market-generated poverty and inequality, and translating 
expanding production capabilities into poverty reduction, greater 
equality, human development and expanding citizenship, is the integra-
tion of universal protection systems and pro-poor economic growth 
(Grosse, Harttgen & Klasen 2005). The pro-poor development strategy 
that follows almost naturally from the political economy approach 
outlined above (see in first section) is based on five principles (Hadnes & 
Klump 2008; Klasen 2001; Maier 2004; Whitfield 2008).
First, mass poverty is the most important problem facing the 
developing countries, and its elimination should be their governments’ 
main priority. This aim is not only important in itself; it is also mandated 
by the United Nations through the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the Declaration on the Right to Development, and successive 
“Development Goals.”
Second, pro-poor growth must benefit the poor more than the rich; 
alternatively, growth is pro-poor when it reduces relative as well as 
absolute poverty (McKinley 2004; Roy & Weeks 2003). The choice of 
pro-poor growth strategies is independent of the long-term relationship 
between equity and growth for, in the pro-poor framework, policies are 
not selected to maximize growth, and equity is not a tool leading to faster 
growth. The case for pro-poor policies is based on the intrinsic value of 
economic equity, and on their potential to deliver the fastest possible 
elimination of poverty and material deprivation.
Third, in order to maximize its redistributive and poverty- 
alleviating impact, growth should target the sectors that directly benefit 
the poor through their output and employment potential, and that can best 
support the growth of productivity and wages. 
Fourth, improvements in distribution and social welfare should be 
pursued directly. These improvements should not be merely marginal or 
conditional on trickle-down, and they must be unambiguous across a 
broad spectrum of measures of welfare and distribution. Changes in the 
initial distribution of income and wealth (e.g., through land reform, 
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universal basic education, training and pensions and other entitlements 
funded by progressive taxation) can promote pro-poor objectives. 
However, these outcomes depend on public policy, because “empirical 
evidence...consistently indicates that size distributions of income are 
quite stable, in the absence of radical changes in institutions and political 
power” (Rao 2002: 7). In addition to those ex ante shifts, the process of 
income generation also needs to change in order to benefit the poor 
disproportionately, for example, through the deployment of industrial 
policy to support strategic activities, employment generation programs, 
minimum wages and incentives for wage increases for low paid workers.
Fifth, the reduction of poverty must be accompanied by initiatives 
to promote equality, because:
In contexts of high inequality, growth is often concentrated 
among sectors that benefit the elite [while] the poor...are 
likely to be excluded.... High levels of inequality make it 
harder to reduce poverty even when economies are growing.... 
Poverty and inequality must thus be considered as 
interconnected parts of the same problem. Poverty is closely 
related to various dimensions of inequality, including income 
status, gender, ethnicity and location. And inequalities are 
manifest across several dimensions, such as employment, 
earnings and access to social services. (UNRISD 2010: 5)
In contrast, neoliberal strategies expect that price stability, fiscal 
rectitude and improvements in static allocative efficiency will spon-
taneously trigger faster growth and poverty reduction. Experience shows 
that these expectations are misplaced, because the emphasis on 
short-term stabilization undercuts the sources of long-term growth and 
reduces the resources available to reduce poverty. Neoliberal policies 
also systematically ignore the need to shift the distribution of income and 
wealth in order to achieve distributional outcomes.16 The systematic 
16 Mainstream approaches to “broad-based” growth, that benefits most people 
regardless of distribution, are examined by Besley and Cord (2007), 
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failure of mainstream policies to achieve their stated objectives and their 
perverse social and economic implications suggest that these policies 
should be abandoned. Pro-poor policies offer a cogent alternative to 
those limited and regressive policies, and a viable avenue for the 
achievement of socially desirable outcomes (for detailed reviews of 
pro-poor policy experiences, see Cornia, 2006; Dagdeviren et al. 2002; 
UNRISD 2010; and Wignaraja, Sirivardana & Hussain 2009). 
In the domain of social policy, pro-poor strategies are related 
to universal rather than targeted programs (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Universal programs can comprise public education, training, health, 
housing, water and sanitation, transportation, parks and public amenities, 
environmental preservation and food security, affordable clothing and so 
on. These initiatives can have low managerial costs and they improve the 
standard of living of the poor directly:
[Pro-poor] programs meet people’s basic needs, contributing 
to the reduction of poverty and to the equalization of the 
income distribution.... Many of these programs...[also] 
contribute to people’s productivity.... The expansion of social 
programs...can be undertaken mostly with domestic resources; 
it therefore does not excessively aggravate the foreign 
exchange problem.... Often these programs can be shaped in 
ways that directly and indirectly contribute to the develop-
ment of democratic participation, which is valuable in itself 
and strengthens the foundation of change. (MacEwan 2003: 
6-7)
In many countries, the administrative infrastructure required to 
implement universal public goods programs is already in place, 
including basic census data, local administrative structures and a banking 
including empirical studies of Bangladesh, Brazil, Ghana, India, Indonesia, 
Tunisia, Uganda and Vietnam. These studies suggest that mainstream 
policies (“the successful implementation of macrostabilization reforms”, 
p.6) are the most efficient strategy to deliver poverty reduction.
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system (or, alternatively, minimally developed cellular telephony and 
mass access to the internet), or it can be built without undue expense. 
Public goods and social wage programs can also be rolled out gradually 
(e.g., one product or service at a time, or in selected regions), making 
them more cost-effective. In spite of their universal coverage, they can 
incorporate several advantages of targeted programs (“smart targeting”): 
they are universal because they are available to all, and they are targeted 
because distinct groups will be affected differently by each project or 
initiative. For example, India and Brazil have experimented with heavily 
subsidized food stores and “popular restaurants” open to all; yet, they 
target the poor through the selection of products for sale (staple foods 
only) and the limited availability of the outlets (in poor areas only). The 
non-poor exclude themselves: a middle-class Indian would not visit a 
slum to purchase ordinary rice, while her Brazilian counterpart would 
never eat pork and beans with her social inferiors, whatever the price of 
the meal. 
Public provision can be supplemented by a universal basic grant 
(UBG), which can help to integrate the poor into sustainable economic 
activities, increase their self-reliance, reduce the poverty gap, promote 
social integration and citizenship, expand employment opportunities, 
increase the workers’ bargaining power (securing further advances in 
distribution), and guarantee a minimum level of income, consumption 
and welfare across society. In doing this, social policy can help to 
empower the poor and overcome some of the most debilitating aspects of 
deprivation. It would also help to alleviate the dependency of the 
destitute upon the merely poor, through the latter’s access to (precarious) 
employment, (meager) pensions and (conditional) cash transfers.17
Conclusion
This article has reviewed different approaches to poverty and 
17 For a detailed analysis of the South African case, see Coleman (2003).
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poverty alleviation, focusing on the literature on CCTs and their 
limitations. It has also examined how social policy can contribute to a 
pro-poor development strategy delivering growth and equity simul-
taneously. This strategy offers more promising opportunities for translat-
ing expanding production capabilities into poverty reduction and human 
development than the neoliberal approach embodied in CCTs.
Mainstream (neoliberal) social policies are grounded on a narrow 
(monetary) conception of poverty, and they tend to rely on meager 
transfers—aid, micro-loans or CCTs—to support market integration 
through consumption or micro-entrepreneurship. These strategies lack 
the commitment to changing the distribution of assets, which would 
increase personal autonomy and improve the distribution of power, and 
they also lack a clear strategy for raising employment and improving 
wages, even though wage work is the most important source of income 
for the poor.
The article has also shown that CCTs are generally small, socially 
divisive and non-transformative; that is, they are fundamentally conser-
vative. Despite these limitations, CCTs implicitly recognize that 
everyone is entitled to a minimum standard of living guaranteed by the 
state. Implementation of this principle suggests that CCT programs could 
be expanded through higher payments, the incremental removal of 
conditionalities, and their universalization.18 Yet, in most countries there 
is limited ideological and institutional support for the transformation of 
existing CCTs into universal transfer programs and, more generally, for 
the deployment of social policy to support rapid reductions in poverty 
and inequality. In those countries, neoliberal policy constraints, including 
contractionary fiscal and monetary policies, liberalized capital flows, 
floating exchange rates and commitment to ultra-low inflation rates have 
narrowed drastically the space for social provision. In addition to this, 
there can be strong resistance by governments, the media and other 
established interests against (new) universal social programs, especially 
18 For a similar argument and approach, see Ferguson (2015: 14, 60, 139).
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in times of “austerity.”
The continuing hegemony of neoliberal macroeconomic policies 
implies that social policy has only limited scope to address poverty and 
inequality. Paradoxically, then, even though CCTs are more or less 
universally seen as beneficial and the outcome of resistance against 
neoliberalism, in reality they are heavily constrained by the neoliberal 
conditions within which they have emerged.
Even if CCTs could be dramatically transformed, it is important to 
be aware of their limits: social policies and their impact are heavily 
constrained by macroeconomic outcomes, which condition the resources 
available and modulate the wealth—as well as poverty—generating 
structures of the system of accumulation. Consequently, social policies 
can play only a supporting role in pro-poor strategies aiming to remove 
the structures of reproduction of poverty and build more equitable 
societies, including the expansion of citizenship, the provision of 
universal public services, the transfer of assets to the poor and the 
improvement of their position in the labor markets. 
The implementation of universal and pro-poor social policies is, 
then, to a large extent dependent upon the deployment of pro-poor 
macroeconomic policies. In turn, the latter depend upon the broader 
social and political balance of forces and the (transformation of the) 
country’s institutional framework. In the meantime, CCTs have achieved 
some successes improving the conditions and life chances of the poor. In 
this sense, they ought to be supported primarily as component parts of a 
broader project of expansion of social provision towards universalization 
and the removal of conditionalities. These social programs could have 
great immediate significance for the poor, and could support the 
emergence of a more ambitious pro-poor development strategy in the 
country.
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